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Abstract 
After 1850, mortality began its long-term fall in most industrialized countries, a process that 
has been linked to rising incomes and improved water infrastructure.  The problem, however, 
is that these contribution are jointly determined and feedback into each other.  Here we 
estimate their impact using a longitudinal data set on mortality and income for each of Paris’ 
80 neighborhoods.  Income and sanitation both contributed to the decrease in mortality, a 
standard deviation increase in either variable produces a two years gain in life expectancy.  
These results give insights on the determinants of the health transition but also on the long-
term evolution of health inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: differential mortality, wealth, urbanization, Paris, sanitation. 
 
JEL codes: I14, I15, N33, N93 
 
 
The authors would like to thank Leah Brooks, Jonathan Chapman, Tracy Dennison, Edward 
Glaeser, Timothy Guinnane, Philip Hoffman, Samantha Myers, Jim Oeppen, Paula Scott, and 
William Summerhill and the participants at seminars at All-UC Huntington conference, Ined, 
Michigan, PSE, Stanford, UCLA, Université Paris-Dauphine, and Yale for helpful comments. 
 2 
Introduction 
The growth in life expectancy over the past two centuries is one of the most striking 
accomplishments of economic development. Humans born today in high income economies 
can expect to live twice as long as their forebears of two centuries ago.  This gain results from 
the growth of both private resources (such as the direct effect of income on life expectancy 
through better nutrition) and public investment (such as the building of water and sewer 
networks).  Evaluating the impact of private and public contributions is necessary if one is to 
consider how best to reduce mortality in developing economies.  The problem, however, is 
that these contributions are jointly determined and feedback into each other.  A society or 
locality with low income is unlikely to be able to afford the expensive investments required to 
procure clean water and to dispose of soiled water.  Conversely, a population with access to 
good sanitation will lose fewer work-days to illness and thus enjoy higher private incomes.  
Moreover, inequality affects the distribution of both private income gains and infrastructure. 
Given that local infrastructure is an excludable local service (not a pure public good), it is 
clear that income inequality may play an important role in shaping conflicts over the extent of 
redistributive policies that provide or deny health-improving infrastructure access to the 
poor.1  For instance, faced with significant connection fees, the poor will not take advantage 
of the most valuable benefits of this infrastructure (Devoto et al. 2012).  Finally income and 
sanitation affect both current health status and human capital.  For instance, nutrition in 
childhood matters over the whole life course, while sanitation networks are built over time 
and older building are usually grandfathered into a regime of voluntary connection. 
The slow diffusion of health-improving infrastructure such as clean water and sanitation 
remains an important problem in large parts of the world today (Banerjee and Duflo 2007, 
Baisa et al. 2010) just as it was a hundred years ago in Europe and North America. In cities of 
the developing world in particular, the diffusion of these technologies is highly uneven though 
they improve health and reduce water-related expenses (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 
2009).  In fact, an important part of the debate today (as in the nineteenth century) involves 
who should pay for expanding infrastructure: landlords, users of water, or the rich more 
generally (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005).  The same was true for Paris between 
1880 and 1914.  The city proved to be a unique and valuable observatory to disentangle all 
these effects.  Its administration bequeathed us good data about mortality, income, and 
                                                 
1
 Some authors even suggest economic inequalities by themselves contribute to increased mortality (Wilkinson 
1996) but this view has been challenged (Deaton 2003). 
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sanitation for each of its 80 neighborhoods and its particular institutional history allows us to 
resolve endogeneity issues. 
Paris is unique among large cities in that its administration steadfastly collected critical 
and detailed information for 80 fixed neighborhoods but its mortality and sanitation 
experience is actually commonplace.  The decline of mortality between 1870 and 1914 was 
widespread in large cities across the North Atlantic economies.  The sharp reduction of 
mortality occurred in the U. S.(Cutler and Miller 2005, Troesken 1999), in Germany(Brown 
1989), and in the U. K. (Szreter 1988) among other countries.  This decline initially allowed 
urban mortality to reach parity with that of rural areas, which had long enjoyed a health 
advantage. Urban mortality then continued to fall, finally giving cities the life expectancy 
advantage over rural areas they currently enjoy.  Time and again scholars have pointed to 
income growth (Birchenall 2007, McKeown 1976) and to the diffusion of water 
infrastructure–piped, filtered, and chlorinated water on one side and sewers on the other 
(Cutler and Miller 2005, Ferrie and Troesken 2008)–to explain why mortality fell so sharply 
and quickly throughout the North Atlantic region.  The central issue is thus to measure the 
impact of these different factors on mortality decline.  Scholars have tried to evaluate the role 
of income or wealth by charting the differential adoption of new water infrastructure across 
cities (Brown 1988).  To evaluate the value of clean water they have looked at specific 
improvements that diffused quickly (e.g. chlorination) after the infrastructure had been put in 
place (Cutler and Miller 2005).  In each case scholars looked at the impact of these measures 
city-wide–in effect treating it as a public good.  These are informative approaches but they 
also have some limitations, the first being the elision of the huge variations that occurred 
within cities.  In each of the major cities (New York, London, or Paris) mortality was both 
high and uneven (the inter-quartile range among districts ranges between 25 and 30% of the 
mean).2 
Given these historical and the contemporary experiences, we use Paris’ unmatched 
detailed data to explain the variation in death rates over time.  They also allow us to show that 
both changes in wealth or income and large-scale public investment contributed to the 
reduction of mortality.  Since the impact of moving from the bottom quartile of the wealth 
distribution to the top one is about the same as that of the adoption of water or sewer 
infrastructure, it is not surprising that scholars that look at settings where one source of 
variance (income or infrastructure) is small attribute all improvement to the other.  Moreover, 
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 London, New York and Paris all reported aggregate death rates by neighborhood (General Register Office 
1881-1901, US Census Office 1894). Only in Paris are neighborhood boundaries fixed in space. 
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once we consider the endogenous diffusion of infrastructure we find that income, clean water, 
and sewers were interrelated.  Indeed, most investments that prolong life are goods that 
involve some user charges that, initially at least, only the wealthiest part of the population is 
willing to pay.  Health innovation thus first brings benefits to the rich. 
There are, of course, different kinds of health innovations. Some can be simply bought 
while others require knowledge rather than riches. In their pure form innovations requiring 
income and those requiring knowledge are quite distinct. Higher income allows individuals to 
purchase goods and services that prolong life (e.g. better nutrition, clothing, and housing).  
Save for possible epidemiological effects, the better food or housing of one family has little 
effect on the life expectancy of another.  At the other extreme, we can place pure knowledge 
effects say for example the benefits of home cleanliness or boiling milk.  Once the value of 
such techniques is known, they can be adopted by everyone because their costs are low.  Of 
course other innovations lie in between: Some are expensive but have economies of scale and, 
as a result, their benefits are greatest if they are adopted by everyone. This is the case with 
sanitation which relies on expensive networks of pipes to distribute clean water and collect 
waste water.3  Although expensive, large scale investments are likely to have been important 
around 1900, since most of the mortality decline have come from reducing the impact of 
infectious diseases (Omran 1971).  However, it is important not to reduce clean water or 
sanitation to a public good because, although they have externalities, they are excludable 
services whose provision occurs under a variety of schemes.  Sanitation, for instance, can of 
course be provided uniformly at public expense, it can also be mandated as part of rebuilding 
programs, or, as is most often the case, it can be left to a fee-for-service public or private 
provider.  In few of these cases can water infrastructure be reduced to a public good. 
Scholars have long known that the correlation between income (or wealth) and health is 
positive, both between (Preston 1975, Pritchett and Summers 1996) and within countries 
(Hummers, Rogers, and Eberstein 1998, Ferrie 2003).  The  relationship has been observed 
and commented upon for two centuries (Villermé 1828).  Many recent studies have tried to 
break down the impact of higher income into the kinds of consumption that it enables: better 
nutrition, housing, hygiene, or access to medical resources (Harris 2004, Fogel 1986, 1992, 
Soares 2007).  But at the same time, there is little evidence that affluence per se improves 
health (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006).  In fact the relationship between economic 
growth and life expectancy is not one way. There are advances and retreats in the evolution of 
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both health and income that are unrelated to each other, whether from the historical record 
(Easterlin 1999) or in contemporary analyses (Deaton and Paxson 2004).  It seems clear that 
“there is no presumption that economic growth will improve health without deliberate public 
action” (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006, Drèze and Sen 2002). 
On the other side, many scholars emphasize infrastructure and local conditions.  These 
can simply be urban disamenities (Szreter and Mooney 1998, Woods 2003, Cain and Hong 
2009).  Scholars have also looked at large scale improvements such as clean water (Cutler and 
Miller 2005, Ferrie and Troesken 2008, Szreter 1988).  As a rule these studies argue that the 
link between income and mortality improvements is weak and instead favor changes in local 
conditions due to infrastructure investments.  Such studies, however, focus on settings where 
the variance in income is relatively small and the variance in the environment is relatively 
large (for instance looking across U.K. or U.S. cities).  Our contribution focuses on a very 
specific environment (one of the largest cities in Europe) where the range of economic 
circumstances was particularly broad. 
This paper has three goals.  The first is to establish that the debate over income versus 
infrastructure is to a large extent a false one: both are very important mechanisms for reducing 
urban mortality.  Our second goal, is to document the long-term evolution of life expectancy 
in Paris and its extraordinarily marked spatial and temporal variation–something Paris shares 
with every other large city.  It is no great surprise that the poorest neighborhoods were also 
those where life was shortest, but both the extent of the mortality gradient and its evolution 
over time are striking. Third, we demonstrate that the advent of sanitation (direct connection 
of a building’s wastewater pipes to the sewers) did reduce mortality. However, the fee-for-
service nature of the diffusion process led to early adoption by rich neighborhoods and thus a 
temporary increase in differential mortality.  To take both into account at once, we use an 
instrument for connection to sewers to deal with their endogenous diffusion, and show that 
income growth and the diffusion of sewers were about equally beneficial.  Throughout the 
paper we focus on life expectancy and mortality risk from age one or older because Parisian 
records do not allow the reconstruction of infant mortality–but in the absence of this omission, 
our results would likely be stronger as it is commonly accepted that much of the benefits of 
income gains or public infrastructure come to the very young.  Our findings of a very steep 
life expectancy-income profile and a very large benefit of sewer adoption are thus likely to be 
downward-biased relative to what the population actually experienced. 
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I. Paris as a laboratory 
Paris is a very good laboratory to study differential mortality:  first, because 
administrative boundaries within the city have not changed since 1860; and second, because 
the municipal statistical office was staffed by individuals obsessed with collecting and 
publishing detailed demographic and infrastructure data.  Their efforts allow us to track the 
evolution of mortality between 1880 and 1913 for each of the 80 neighborhoods (quartier) of 
the city.4  On the demographic side, the statistical office published death totals by sex, broken 
down into six age categories for each year and neighborhoods, starting in 1880 as well as a 
series of detailed abstracts for the city drawn from the national population censuses from 1881 
to 1911. Taken together these two datasets allow us to compute mortality rate and life 
expectancy at the neighborhoods level (see appendix B. for details).  Unfortunately we cannot 
compute infant mortality because middle- and lower-class Parisians very frequently employed 
wet nurses who lived some distance from the capital until late in the nineteenth century 
(Rollet-Echalier 1982, Preston and van de Walle 1974). 
On the income side we do not have access to a panel data for income at the neighborhood 
level but we do have excellent data on the distribution of rents across the city.  Indeed, the 
city carried out and we computerized four real estate censuses (1876, 1890, 1900, and 1910).  
For each neighborhood, the censuses distribute housing units in two dozen categories of rent 
levels, including two for those dwellings below the threshold of the taxe mobilière (a direct 
tax assessed on the basis of occupation and of the rental value of the household’s dwelling).  
The top category in 1890 comprised 521 dwellings each assessed at more than 16,000 francs 
in rent.5  Although these data provide ample evidence of the correlation between rent and life 
expectancy, they are too infrequent for our purposes.  So to supplement the censuses we 
collected neighborhood level fiscal data for every five years from 1876 to 1911 from the 
summary registers of the taxe mobilière in the archive of the finance ministry.  These data 
include the number of households who paid a rent above the fiscal threshold and the total rent 
they paid. 
Since the average rent reported by the tax authorities is a varying fractile of the 
underlying rent distribution, we need to prove that it can be a good statistic for neighborhood 
income.  This demonstration involves two steps, the average fiscal rent must be a good 
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 The city was divided into twenty administrative districts (arrondissements) that were each split into four 
quartiers or neighborhoods. 
5
 With per capita income below 600 francs in that year (Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon 1990), such rents would 
correspond to housing units with rentals values of 1 million dollars or more in the U.S. today and 650,000 Euros 
or more in France. 
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statistic for average rent and then rents must be good proxies for income. The first step is 
easy.  We compute the average rent paid by households above the threshold, this average rent 
isvery closely correlated with the average rent for the total population reported in the four real 
estate censuses (the correlation between the two measures in the same year is never less than 
0.97).  Though truncated, the fiscal rent data are an effective statistic for average rents at the 
neighborhood level. 
They are also a good proxy for income, both for theoretical and empirical reasons.  On the 
theory side, it seems logical that housing is a normal good and hence housing expenditures 
(rents) will be correlated with income.  More precisely, let us start by assuming that 
households devote a fixed fraction of their consumption to housing and that the individual 
household heterogeneity averages out within neighborhoods so that the budget-share of 
housing can be taken as constant across neighborhoods.  To be sure there are some worries 
with this framework.  The most notable is that the budget-share of housing might well be 
increasing with total consumption (housing being, in effect, a luxury good).  In this case using 
rents as a proxy for consumption would overstate the rate of growth of consumption.  The 
second is that household structure is likely to be directly related to budget share of housing 
(with larger households devoting relatively more of the budget to housing for a given total 
consumption).  Moreover if household structure is related to aggregate consumption there are 
likely to be systematic differences in the budget share of housing across neighborhoods.  In 
the absence of finer-grain data, however, we cannot address these issues in the statistical 
analysis.  Yet measurement error due to household heterogeneity is likely to create attenuation 
bias.  Increasing budget shares for housing will also tend to understate the income effect 
(because a doubling of rent expenditures is associated with a less than doubling of income).  
Thus both biases work against rather than in favor of the argument that income improves life 
expectancy.  It seems reasonable to take rents to proxy consumption (leaving aside the issue 
of whether this consumption was funded out of current or future income or out of savings). 
On the empirical side, we can test this argument in 1890s Paris.  Indeed although there is 
no regular source for incomes by neighborhood, we produce an estimate of income for the 
early 1890s at the district (arrondissement) level.  To do so we combine information on 
wealth from estate documents (for capital income), information on labor income from the 
industrial survey of 1896 and information on district level occupational distribution to 
produce a cross section of Parisian incomes (see Appendix C).  As the appendix details, the 
procedure involves some assumptions but whatever choices we make always produce a set of 
average incomes that are very are strongly correlated with average rents.  Indeed the 
 8 
correlation is at least 0.8, despite the fact that we had to omit a lot of the within occupation 
wage variations.  Overall, it seems clear that rents are a good statistic for income. 
What do rents tell us about the variation in consumption? The real estate census of 1876 
provides a striking image of the city’s inequality (Figure II). The wealthy (paying annual rents 
over 1000 francs) comprised less than 10% of households. The poor (who paid less than 300 
francs rents) made up 68% of households.  These different groups lived in different places and 
rents reflect these contrasts:  Rents in the Champs Élysées neighborhood averaged 3,200 
francs, nearly twenty times the 179 francs of the rents in Charonne.  This difference in rents in 
part reflects the massive differences in the quality of the housing units (the size of apartments, 
amenities like running water, toilets within the apartment rather than in the hallway or on the 
ground floor, in air quality) but it is also likely that there were pure location rents. Indeed the 
high rent districts were clustered around the financial center (the Bourse) and its political 
counterpart (the Élysée). It is also not surprising that life expectancy for the privileged few in 
the west was almost 8 years longer than in the poor neighborhoods in the east. 
[Figure II about here] 
We also have information on access to clean water and how dirty water was dealt with.  
Although, as elsewhere in Europe or the U.S., clean water did play a role in decreasing 
mortality, especially infant mortality (Preston and van de Walle 1978), we lack the data to 
analyze its impact within Paris.  Indeed, by 1885 two-thirds of Parisian buildings were 
connected to the city’s water supply (Cebron de Lisle 1991: 547) and by then the vast 
majority of homes received pure (spring) water brought in by aqueduct (Deligny 1883: 
Annexe n°1, p. 49).  After that date differential access to clean water was not an issue 
(Goubert 1986: 90-92, Bocquet, Chatzis, and Sander 2008).  But the diffusion and increased 
use of clean water (for whatever purpose) raised a new problem: removing the soiled water. 
At the same time, the effect of improvements in water infrastructure may also be long-
lasting, the so-called Mills–Reincke phenomenon (Ferrie 2008).  Indeed, as Preston and van 
de Walle (1978) show, the mortality decline in Paris featured strong cohort effects, but they 
cannot establish if  these effects were connected with water infrastructures, better nutrition, or 
any other factors.  Here we narrow the focus to variation within Paris and concentrate our 
analysis on the thirty years at the turn of the century.  It is the period when we can observe 
precisely variations in mortality, income (rents), and the water infrastructure.  To do so, we 
take advantage of annual reports on the fraction of buildings that had a direct connection to 
the sewer by neighborhood.  But our time frame precludes any cohort analysis.   
 9 
The halcyon days of the statistical office ended abruptly in 1913.  Afterwards, and despite 
a massive increase in the city’s involvement in sanitation, it curtailed its detailed reports.  
After WWI some data were only given by district, the city ceased publishing its abstracts 
from the population censuses or any real estate information, and even the treasury striped its 
internal reports of their useful information. So we limit our analysis to the period before 1914, 
when the most important improvements occurred. 
Studying mortality within Paris poses serious complications. The most obvious of these is 
that, like every large city, its population is not closed.  In fact, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, six out of ten people living in Paris had not been born there or in the suburbs (census 
results from 1886 to 1901) and this proportion varies little between districts.6  Migrants to 
Paris are also not a random sample of the world or of France’s population. In fact migrants 
choose to move to Paris, and the city’s residents chose which neighborhood to live in.  Indeed, 
changes in the mortality of Parisians could be simply attributed to changes in rates of 
migration or in migrants’ characteristics.  Yet in prior work we established that migrants from 
the countryside to cities were positively selected.  Shortly after migrating, they had lower 
mortality than either those who stayed behind, or those whom they joined in cities.  After a 
decade of urban residence, however, migrants’ mortality converged to that of individuals who 
were born and resided in cities (Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal 2011).  Our analysis will take 
advantage of these results by examining differences in mortality rates by age because both 
youth and older groups will not be so sensitive to in-migration rates. 
The second selection effect, residential sorting, also complicates the analysis. Indeed, 
consider two reasons for a neighborhood to have higher life-expectancy: income buys a longer 
life and some neighborhoods are healthier than others. These two effects need not be 
connected. Suppose that high income buys a longer life span and that high-income individuals 
want to live near each other because they value similar cultural amenities or economic 
networking. Moreover these high income neighborhoods have no attributes that affect life 
expectancy.  Conversely, it could be that income is irrelevant in itself but that some 
neighborhoods have attributes that make them healthier places to live.  Households with high 
income might well seek to live in such better neighborhoods and thus bid up the rental price 
of housing.  In both cases we would observe a positive relationship between income and life 
span and a positive association between rich neighborhoods and life span. In the first case, the 
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 The information is available only at the district level: all districts except for three have between 57 and 70% of 
their population not born in Paris or the Seine department. The three remaining have 50, 51 and 74% 
respectively at both extremes of the distribution. 
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neighborhoods are good because they are rich and in the second the neighborhoods are rich 
because they are good.  In a cross section identifying causation is virtually impossible to 
resolve, and empirically Paris seems to fit both phenomena. On the one side, Paris’s rich 
neighborhoods are in the west, upwind from the poorer east and thus with less polluted air. On 
the other, the rich also hired many female servants, whose work (cleaning the home, washing 
clothes and linens, preparing food) reduced mortality.  While we cannot precisely disentangle 
these two chains of causation, it seems that the pure geographical characteristics of the 
neighborhoods were far less important than either their infrastructure or the income of their 
denizens.  Indeed Paris is compact with limited variation in its environment.  Rich 
neighborhoods include both the 7th and 1st districts along the Seine and the higher altitude 16th 
and 8th districts. The poor 5th is actually upstream from the rich 7th.  Save for air quality, the 
rich did not congregate in ‘naturally’ healthy environments, though they did congregate a lot.7 
We estimate the role of income and infrastructure from changes in mortality over time 
within neighborhood.  To do so we deploy year fixed effects to net out any common 
demographic shocks (as well as the general trend of improvement in mortality) and 
neighborhood fixed effects to eliminate the permanent differences between different parts of 
Paris.  Such an approach helps resolve migration issues because the structure of migration 
across Paris was very stable.  Overall, the share of Parisian residents born elsewhere was 62, 
59, and 61% respectively in 1886, 1896, and 1901.  More importantly, the share of migrants 
by district was stable.  Indeed, the ranking of districts in term of the share of non-Parisian 
residents does not vary at all over time. 8   Second, fixed effects eliminate most natural 
variations between neighborhoods and allow us to focus on what changes over time, like the 
diffusions of sanitation.  People moved within Paris but migration was both very local and 
less frequent than one might have expected (Farcy and Faure 2003: 370).  If males’ 
migrations aged 20 to 45 are any indication, 30% of  within Paris moves occurred within the 
same neighborhood, 40% within the same district and 78% within the same area –center or 
periphery (Farcy and Faure 2003: 345-346).  In fact, the ranking of neighborhoods changes 
little over time for either wealth or life expectancy (see Appendix B.).  So most of the changes 
occur within neighborhoods (and over time), which is the part of the variation we intend to 
exploit.  One might still worry such a direct statistical approach. Because rich neighborhoods 
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 The case of London is slightly different because the rich West End is both upstream and upwind of the poor 
East End. 
8
 Of course, they may be variations over time in the characteristics of the migrants (e.g. their health advantage 
towards living conditions in Paris). But such a variation would have to be very large to modify the differences in 
life expectancy between neighborhoods we observe. 
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adopted direct connection, it might seem that the statistical impact of sewer adoption 
overstates its real impact because it includes an income effect. Landlords, however, might 
adopt direct connection where it reduces mortality most.  There are good economic reasons to 
believe that these problems are not severe, in particular because the inclusion of income in a 
regression with sewer connection rates has little impact on the sewer coefficient.  
Nevertheless, as a robustness check we implement an IV approach which produces quite 
similar results in magnitude even though standard errors are much larger. 
 
II. Mortality and wealth inequality in time and space 
Figure I presents the average life expectancy for Paris (the black line) and for France (the 
dotted line).9  The figure also shows the life expectancy for the worst eight (the red line) and 
the best eight (the dotted red line) neighborhoods in the capital.  The variation within Paris 
dwarfs the difference between in Paris and France.  In fact individuals in the worst 
neighborhoods in Paris always had a life span about seven years below the city average and 
ten to fifteen years less than French people as a whole (a difference that is echoed in age at 
death differentials across the wealth distribution, see Piketty, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 
2006).  In contrast, in the early 1880s in the best neighborhoods life expectancy was thirteen 
year higher than the rest of the city and a four year more than the rest of France with their 
excess mortality driven mainly by infectious diseases (Kuagbenou and Biraben 1998).  Over 
the next three decades life expectancy in the best districts rose quickly and neared 65 years, 
extending their lead over the rest of France and Paris.  The last decade before WWI saw 
somewhat more rapid gains at the bottom than at the top. 
While even today differences in lifespan based on wealth or neighborhood remain, they 
are tiny relative to a century ago.  Increased longevity, it seems, has been one of the more 
widely distributed benefits of long-term economic growth (Peltzman 2009, Becker, Philipson, 
and Soares 2005).  As noted above, while its timing is specific, Paris’ mortality decline was 
part of the general epidemiological transition in North Atlantic countries during which the fall 
in infectious diseases erased the urban penalty (for the US, see Haines 2001, for UK, see 
Woods 2003, for the debate about contemporary rural-urban differences, see Bocquier, 
Madise, and Zulu 2011). 
[Figure I about here] 
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 The share of Paris in the French population was 4.5% at the beginning of our period and 7% at the end. 
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The relatively poor performance of Paris’s worst neighborhoods is not for lack of 
economic or urban growth. Indeed the French economy, despite a difficult decade in the 
1880s due to low agricultural prices, grew steadily up to World War I and Paris was a major 
beneficiary.  The capital city’s share of France’s population and wealth was at an all time high 
in 1913.  In contrast to France as a whole (Bonneuil 1997), economic growth did not readily 
translate into a reduction of life expectancy inequality in Paris.  The huge heterogeneity in life 
expectancy within Paris is not the product of neighborhoods having tiny populations with 
unusual life circumstances.  Even in the 1880s each rich neighborhood had at least 20,000 
inhabitants (and 40,000 on average) and the poor ones almost 30,000 (and 60,000 on average). 
An average Paris neighborhood would have had around 57,000 inhabitants in the 1880s and 
68,000 in the 1900s.  The massive range of life expectancy comes instead from deep 
differences in living conditions. 
 
Let us start with the cross sectional correlation between income and mortality.  We 
estimate a simple linear relationship between average fiscal rent and life expectancy at age 1 
once every five years from 1881 to 1911.10  The first regression for 1881 shows a strong 
association between life expectancy and average fiscal rent. The relationship increases in each 
subsequent cross section to 1891, in part because of an increase in life expectancy in high rent 
neighborhoods.  The second cause of the growing sensitivity of life expectancy to fiscal rent 
is that the fraction of poor households tended to decline everywhere even though their 
mortality patterns did not change much.  The coefficient for fiscal rent is largest for 1891.  
Surprisingly, the role of income then declines and the coefficient we estimate for 1911, 
though still large is in fact lower than that of 1881 (and statistically different from that of 
1891).  The constant term (which estimates the mean life expectancy for each year) is 
increasing throughout, evidence of large city-wide gains in life expectancy (it grows from 44 
to just under 53years).  We estimated the same cross section regressions for mortality by age 
group and by sex in regressions we do not report.  They show a similar pattern of increase in 
the impact of income on mortality to 1891 followed by a decline.  Across age groups the 
magnitude of the coefficients increases, but because mortality risk is increasing in age, the 
proportional impact is similar across ages (these results should allay fears that changes over 
time were driven by changes in selective migration). Finally, we found no statistical 
                                                 
10 We also estimated other specifications–log-linear and log-log–of that relationship (not reported). The general 
pattern and the conclusion we draw from it remain identical. 
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differences between sexes: living in a wealthier neighborhood reduced mortality risk in quite 
similar ways for men and women. 
[Table I about here] 
This general improvement suggests something other than simple income growth 
improved life expectancy.  Given the steep life-expectancy to rent profile in 1881 we might 
imagine that even small gains in income would have had a large effect on life expectancy.  To 
evaluate the hypothesis that all the changes that follow 1881 are simply income effects we ask, 
what would life expectancy have been in 1900 and 1910 if the rent to life expectancy link had 
been constant? We simply apply the coefficients of the 1881 regression to the rent distribution 
in later years (see Figure III).  When we do so, we find systematic errors across the range of 
rents in 1900 and 1910.  And the errors are nearly all one way, realized life expectancy was 
significantly higher than what was predicted by the effects of income growth alone and the 
gap is increasing in rent.  One cannot blame inflation or other shocks since this was a period 
of limited price changes and of increasing prosperity. It seems longer life had become cheaper 
to buy.   
[Figure III about here] 
Clearly then, we can reject the idea that the relationship between consumption and life 
expectancy was fixed (the coefficients change over time in important and systematic ways). 
Moreover, for Paris in particular, both the evolution of aggregate rents and of business taxes 
are consistent with steady economic growth from 1880 to 1914.  As others have shown, 
wealth accumulation was not very sensitive to economic downturns, either the one that 
followed the Franco-Prussian war or the agricultural crisis of the 1880s (Lévy-Leboyer and 
Bourguignon 1990).  Moreover although one might see the divergence 1880 to 1891 as caused 
by increasing inequality (Piketty, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2004), the convergence that 
follows occurs under the same regime of high inequality that prevailed until WWI.  The 
convergence, therefore, requires some innovation that reduced the impact of income on life 
span. In the next section, we argue that the development of water infrastructure was 
responsible for the convergence.  Overall, life expectancy in Paris was very unequal, with 
large differences among neighborhoods (and much larger than among French departments) 
and closely related to income. 
 
III. Sanitation and wealth 
Clearly then, income first became more valuable over time for prolonging life, with a 
peak around 1891, and then a bit less valuable over time.  Our hypothesis is that this evolution 
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is driven by the spatial diffusion of sanitation and by the more rapid implementation of direct 
connection to sewers in rich neighborhoods.  Sanitation is generally seen as a major public 
health improvement, something that requires huge investment but benefits the whole 
population. It is thus a standard example of a public good.  A closer look however, reveals 
that sanitation, and indeed most public health infrastructure, has to be laid out spatially and, as 
a result, benefits those neighborhoods that adopt first.  Nor surprisingly these tend to be the 
toniest ones.  Such processes are then exacerbated when there are significant connection fees, 
because the rich will be early adopters within each neighborhood. 
Before addressing the issue of the relationship between wealth and access to sanitation, 
we briefly review the history of sanitation in Paris.  The major sewers lines, which had been 
installed in most of Paris by the 1860s, could only accommodate liquid waste (Chevallier 
2010: 244-246).  Buildings were then equipped with a variety of waste disposal systems.  In 
the most basic type, residents had to empty their waste water into pits or tanks that would later 
be taken away by night soil companies.  More often buildings were equipped with waste pipes 
(these were often installed at the same time as running water) that emptied either into tanks or 
into filtering tanks (akin to septic systems) that captured solids and let the liquids drain to 
sewers or the street.  These tanks then had to be emptied regularly. In either case, the residents 
of buildings were exposed to contaminants of waste water.  In 1886 the city first allowed 
landlords to connect their buildings’ waste water pipes directly to the sewer (Jacquemet 1979: 
517). Thus landlords had to decide whether to retrofit their buildings and pay an annual fee of 
60 francs per downpipe that was connected to the sewer.  Given an average rent of 300 francs 
per apartment in 1876 this fee was sizeable. To encourage owners of buildings in poor 
neighborhood to connect, buildings that rented for less than 500 francs faced a reduced fee of 
30 francs.  The fee remained substantial if rents did not respond to this improvement: in the 
poorest neighborhoods, more than 90% of the household paid less than 300 francs in rent.  
Then in 1894 the city made connection mandatory, but the law was selectively enforced.  
Older buildings were in effect grand-fathered and their owners decided whether or not to 
connect.  For new construction, however, the law was binding. In fact, by the end of 1904, ten 
years after connections were mandated, only 37,342 buildings were directly connected to the 
sewers, half the total number of buildings in Paris.  Nearly all structures built after 1894 were 
directly connected to the sewer; but connections in the old arrondissements where there was 
nearly no new construction show no sharp jump after that date. 
Beyond its own efforts at improving the worst areas of Paris (Ilots insalubres), and the 
price discounts detailed above, the city did little to promote sewers (Jacquemet 1979).  
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Nevertheless sewer connections grew with two inflections, an early acceleration in the mid 
1890s and then a slowdown in the mid 1900’s (Figure IV).  In fact by 1906, the rate of sewer 
adoption seems to have settled into some long-term process (slightly faster in the poorer, less 
connected neighborhoods; slightly slower in the richer ones). As a result there were steady 
gains.  By 1913 almost 70% of the buildings were connected, although the 20th, 13th and 12th 
districts on the eastern edge of the city had yet to pass 60%.  By 1928 when the detailed 
reports end, the connection rate topped 85% in the quartile of most favored districts and 
ranged between 67 and 77% in the bottom quartile. Hence sewers were a technological 
change whose endogenous adoption favored rich neighborhoods over poor ones for some time 
and thus actually furthered the spatial inequality within the city well past World War I. 
[Figure IV about here] 
Figure IV shows clearly that the most affluent neighborhoods in the city had the highest 
rate of connection at any point in time.  A simple linear regression confirms that wealth was a 
strong determinant of the rate at which buildings were connected to sewers (Table II).11  
Beyond the obvious idea that those who pay for it will get it first, we need to be more specific 
about the mechanisms that explain why the wealthiest neighborhoods get access to sanitation 
much earlier.  A little theory helps frame the decisions of three sets of actors.  First, each 
renter must decide how much to bid up rents for an apartment in a building directly connected 
to the sewers. Second, each landlord must choose whether to provide a direct connection to 
the sewer. Third, the city’s sanitation department has to prioritize the extension of the sewer-
pipe system.12 
[Table II about here] 
Consistent with our assumption that rents can stand as a good proxy for consumption, let 
us assume that the willingness of Parisian households to pay for a direct sewer connection 
increases with income.  In effect, direct connection to the sewers is a luxury good: the rich are 
more willing to pay for the service than the poor.  And there will be a threshold income above 
which households are willing to pay at least the average cost of connecting to the sewer. 
Now let us turn to building owners and the way real estate was owned in Paris prior to 
WWI.  As the 1900 real estate census reports, the 883,871housing units in the city were 
divided among 74,025 buildings.  In this period, (before condominium associations), each 
                                                 
11
 Given the fast increase in sewer connection rates, it is clear that we need to use the full yearly sample from 
1885 to 1913 if we are to understand the phenomenon. To do so, we linearly interpolate fiscal rents between 
census years (every five years). The data on the fiscal rents available yearly at the district level allow us to 
control that it is quite a good approximation. 
12By 1894 each arrondissement had at least 65% of the sewers it would have in 1911 and for the city as a whole 
80% of the sewers’ extant at the end of the period had been put in place before connections became mandatory)  
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building had at most one owner.  Thus, at the very least 82% of the households were renters.  
The real proportion was no doubt higher given that many buildings in poor neighborhoods 
were owned by individuals who were renters in other nicer buildings and that, if the estate tax 
data are any indication, the very rich owned multiple buildings.  Thus, the decision to connect 
to the sewer was made by landlords who wanted to maximize rental income—but their 
decision depended on how much their tenants would bid up rents if units were directly 
connected to the sewer.   
As long as the demand for sewer connection is an increasing function of income, rent will 
increase more in absolute value for an expensive apartment than for a cheap one.  Thus 
landlords’ incentives to provide the improvement will increase with the quality of their 
buildings.  The initial 30 or 60 francs per connected down pipe fee made it a costly 
investment–by some account double the costs of traditional septic tanks.  Thus it is not 
surprising that connections rose more quickly in richer than in poorer areas–and that income 
and infrastructure were correlated.  As long as the connection decision was left within private 
hands, there was bound to be a delay in the take up of poor neighborhoods. 
One might think that the city could have levied a tax (on buildings or consumption) and 
connected all buildings in short order.  Yet in a highly unequal society political economic 
considerations will get in the way of any such scheme.  Indeed, any such compulsory scheme 
would feature either a subsidy from landlords to poor tenants or from the top part of the 
income distribution towards the bottom.  Because the size of the subsidy rises with inequality, 
the rich’s opposition to any such scheme also grows with the level of inequality.  In any case, 
Parisian landlords were publicly opposed to any legal requirement that they connect their 
buildings to the sewer.  They waged a long judicial and political battle to delay the passage 
and implementation of the 1894 ordinance that made connection to sewer mandatory 
(Jacquemet 1979).  Owners of buildings in the Champs Élysées neighborhood did adopt the 
new technology with great alacrity, because doing so led tenants to bid up the value of their 
rents by more than the cost of implementing the new technology.  In poorer neighborhoods, 
tenants would still desire the improvements but, with a smaller budget, they could only offer 
much smaller increases in rent to landlords–not enough to induce them to retrofit buildings. 
Now we can step back to the city planners’ decisions.  Let us assume they knew that 
water-borne diseases were a major contributor to the city’s mortality, and that mortality was 
particularly high in poor neighborhoods and thus wanted to maximize the diffusion of the 
sewers.  To pay for additional infrastructure, they could borrow as long as user charges 
covered interest and maintenance. In this case, it would make sense to equip richer 
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neighborhoods faster than poorer ones, and indeed the correlation between rents and the ratio 
of street to sewer length per arrondissement is positive. It is largest early on (0.65 in 1880) 
and then declines over time as more and more neighborhoods become better equipped (0.47 
by 1906).  In fact, the increase in sewers’ length was much faster than building connections: 
as the city were pushing for adoption, it did its part of the job by swiftly implementing new 
sewers (to be sure main sewers existed for centuries in the old part of the city and were all 
completed before the end of the 19th century in the periphery). In all cases, sewer equipment 
was in no way a binding constraint on adoption–even in the poorer neighborhood–as most of 
the needed underground infrastructure was completed even before the 1894 ordinance.  It also 
makes sense to price discriminate and charge high-rent buildings more than low-rent 
buildings and use the proceeds to expand the network.  This is precisely the mechanism used 
by the city with variations over time.  In 1888, when connection was voluntary, owners faced 
30 or 60 francs fees per connected pipe. But by the end of the century, with mandatory 
connection, a more complex schedule was in place: the schedule had twelve different fee 
levels ranging from 10 to 1500 francs annually per building (Préfecture de la Seine 1899: 9).  
Capturing the fees available from expensive housing units would thus be a priority and the 
system would expand there first.   Overall, however, diffusion was slow because as noted 
above there were relatively few rich housing units available to subsidize the vast number of 
housing units rented by the poor. It was also slow due to the hostility of building owners and 
the political obstacles the city encountered in enforcing the 1894 ordinance (Jacquemet 1979: 
535-545). 
 
IV. Sanitation, income and mortality 
Let us now look at life expectancy, sewers, and income directly, temporarily leaving aside 
the sewer-rent relationship.  Table III below reports regressions of life expectancy on, first, 
the fraction of buildings connected to the sewers and, second, the average rents by 
neighborhood; both with and without fixed effects.  The dataset includes one observation per 
neighborhood per year.  We begin with a straightforward correlation taking in all 
neighborhoods and without fixed effects.  Sewers seem to have had significant positive 
benefits, adding nearly four years to Parisians’ life expectancy.  The impact of increasing 
sewers by one standard deviation (28%) is a bit less that doing the same for rents, and it is 
robust to including rents.  Overall, neighborhoods that are one standard deviation below the 
mean in either rents or sewers have a life expectancy three years lower than those at the mean.   
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The results are robust to splitting the sample between the center (where most building 
were old and connecting to the sewers involved a retrofit) and the periphery (where new 
construction drove connection).  Although the impact of both rent and sewer connection fall 
by about two thirds when we add the full set of fixed effects, they remain highly statistically 
significant.  The effects of sewers and rents are also economically significant since in the 
periphery a standard deviation increase in either rents or sewer connection increases life 
expectancy by two years.  The decline in magnitude of the coefficients when we add fixed 
effects is clearly linked to the fact that all three phenomena we observe (decline of mortality, 
sewer connection, and increase in income) changed monotonically over time, so much of their 
variance is absorbed by the fixed-effects. But the fixed effects also net out local 
characteristics, annual demographic shocks and trends and so forth. In these conditions, it is 
all the more remarkable that the coefficients on sewers and rents remain well identified, for 
both Paris as a whole and for the periphery.  For the center of Paris, where the built 
environment is much older, the process of change is not differentiated enough over time and 
space to allow us to identify parameters with the full set of fixed effects.  More importantly, 
the explanatory power of the regression that includes both variables is significantly higher 
than with either one variable, which suggests each has an independent effect (in the models 
without fixed-effects).  Similarly, in the models that include fixed-effects the coefficient of 
sewers changes little when the rent variable is included (and the same is true for the 
coefficient of rents when we include sewers) and remains statistically significant.  Overall, 
sewers do seem to have had an important and significant impact in prolonging life. 
[Table III about here] 
One can also examine the impact of sewers and rents on mortality by age group and by 
sex.  There are two reasons to do so. First, one might imagine that women who bore the 
burden of the washing, cooking, cleaning, and childrearing would be more likely to benefit 
than men from sewers because they came in closer contact with soiled water.  Second, if one 
were worried about the results being driven by migration, looking at older ages provides a 
robustness check since these groups were relatively less affected by in migration.  To do so 
we look at age specific mortality risk as dependent variables, thus a negative coefficient 
implies lower risk and higher life expectancy. Table IV mirrors Table III for mortality risks, 
presenting first sewers alone, then rents alone, and finally both variables in the same 
regression.  The first striking finding is that there are no statistical differences by sex.  Men 
seem to have slightly larger gross benefits but because their mortality risk is higher on 
average, the proportional reductions are very similar.  The mortality risk reduction from 
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sewers is highest at younger ages.  What is surprising, though, is that the effect persists even 
past age 60: it remains statistically significant even if we include fixed effects. Again, sewers 
offered substantial declines in mortality risk.   
[Table IV about here] 
Nevertheless it is clear both from principles and from the spatial pattern of diffusion that 
sewer adoption is related to income. In that case, our direct regressions would clearly 
overstate the effect of sanitation, which in part results from wealthy neighborhoods’ early 
adoption.  Similarly any regression of life expectancy on income would overstate the impact 
of income gains over time.  As a first pass, we included both rent and sewer in the regressions 
and although the coefficients for both variables decline by about one third when included 
together, they are both still large and statistically significant, and of similar magnitude. 
Yet despite these strong results one might be concerned that even if sewer adoption is not 
a proxy for income growth, it is endogenous.  Thus we face both an identification and an 
endogeneity challenge.  The identification challenge is to insure that sewers effects are not 
just a pass through of income gain effects.  The endogeneity challenge is that the 
neighborhoods that adopt sewers first might do so because omitted factors make sewers most 
efficacious there.  It should be noted that such factors would need to vary over time within a 
neighborhood (since either spatial or time invariant factors would be neutralized by our space 
and time fixed-effects).  Among those possible factors we might think that the wealthy may 
be more prone to adopting sewers, increasing their cleanliness, and using new medical 
knowledge.  While it is unlikely that these concerns are significant, an instrumental variable 
approach would be a good robustness check. 
We thus need an instrument that is correlated to sewer adoption but not to a 
neighborhood’s income.  We also need that variable to pass the exclusion restriction, namely 
that it does not act on its own to improve life expectancy.  Most candidate instruments for 
sewer adoption fall by the wayside either because there are correlated with income or with 
mortality directly.  We use the cumulated building permits starting in 1896 interacted with 
location.  The ordonnance of July 1894 that mandated connection to sewer for new buildings 
applied to those building permitted in 1895 and occupied in 1896.  Additionally, we divide 
Paris into its old ‘center’ and the new ‘periphery’.  The center (districts 1 to 11) had a very 
stable population (about 1.2 million between 1881 and 1911) and an equally stable stock of 
buildings. In the center the ratio of building permits issued between 1882 and 1913 to the 
stock of buildings in 1913 is 0.32; and the stock of building in 1896 represented 97% of the 
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stock of 1913.  In the center new buildings accounted for a tiny fraction of connections: our 
instrument is not valid. 
In contrast, in the periphery (districts 12 to 20), population grew by more than 60% from 
1881 to 1913 and most buildings were erected after 1880.  The ratio of building permits 
issued between 1882 and 1913 to the stock of buildings in 1913 is 0.77.  More importantly the 
stock of buildings in 1896 was only 79% of the stock of 1913.  While new constructions were 
of much better quality than the initial buildings (rents increased much more on the periphery 
than in the center) the growth of the stock is clearly related to the growth of the city overall 
and not nearly so much to rents. In fact, the correlation between rents in 1876 (or any 
subsequent year through 1900) and the ratio of building permits to total buildings is negative 
overall.  More importantly it is very close to zero (e.g. -0.03 in 1876, and 0.06 in 1900) for the 
periphery.  Because building permits vary over time we can afford to include fixed effects in 
the regression when we use them as an instrument. 
Clearly then, in the periphery, building permits were related to sewer connections but not 
to rents. They allow us to identify effects other than income on mortality.  Yet they have a 
serious potential disadvantage: new buildings are typically better than old ones, and thus 
building permits might fail the exclusion restriction.  In this view, the problem is that new 
buildings, although connected to the sewer, are likely to have had other life-prolonging 
attributes.  Thus the building permits are markers of other investments that improve life 
expectancy.  There is an alternative view that suggests that new construction was good in rich 
neighborhood and not very good in poor ones and that the mandate for direct connection was 
the most important element in improving buildings.  Hence new constructions would have 
improved life expectancy much more after 1896 (the earliest date when buildings covered by 
the mandate were completed and occupied).  Because our data run for 15 years before and 
after that date, we can test this hypothesis.  Table V shows that, overall, the cumulative 
number of building permits has a strong positive effect on life expectancy–a necessary 
condition if we are to have a useful instrument.  When we break the data down into two sub 
periods (one before 1896 and one after), the difference in impact is striking.  As the second 
panel of Table V shows we cannot identify any direct effect of building permits on life 
expectancy before mandatory connection to sewers was implemented (1896), both overall and 
in the periphery.  After 1896, however, both samples show a positive effect of cumulated 
building permits on life expectancy.  For the center where the number of new buildings was 
tiny, the regressions give huge coefficients that are clearly not credible–the small number of 
new buildings cannot have any meaningful impact.  In sum, looking at building permits 
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before and after sewer connections were mandatory suggests that the exclusion restriction is 
satisfied for the periphery. 
[Table V about here] 
We estimate the effects of both income and sewers on life expectancy using building 
permits after 1896 as instruments for Paris as a whole, as well as for the center and the 
periphery for completeness sake.  The key results come from the peripheral neighborhoods.  
We ran both the two stage least squares and generalized method of moments (GMM) 
regressions.  The two methods produce startlingly close results.  Accordingly we only report 
the two stage least squares results (see Table VI and VII).  
The first half of Table VI reports regression results without fixed effects. These can be 
compared with the results in Table III where we did not instrument.  For Paris as a whole and 
the center the variables have the same sign but only income is significant.  For the periphery, 
where we think the instrument is valid, the impact of sewers is smaller with 2SLS than if 
estimated directly but it remains well-identified and socially significant (one standard 
deviation increase in sewer connections increases life expectancy by two years).  The income 
coefficient remains almost unchanged.  When we add fixed effects the results are equally 
dismal for the center and for Paris as a whole.  In the periphery however, the 2SLS estimate 
coefficient is not very different from what we estimated without instruments and fixed effects, 
or with fixed effects and without instruments: one standard deviation increase in sewers adds 
between two and three years of life expectancy.  Interestingly, the coefficient of rents suggest 
a roughly similar effect: a standard deviation increase in income also increases life expectancy 
by two to three years. Where our instrument is supposed to work, the results suggest that 
neither identification nor endogeneity are major problems.  The 2SLS and the OLS results are 
equivalent. We find the same thing if we examine different impact by sex, again focusing 
solely on the periphery, it seems that income gains were equally important for reducing the 
mortality of women and men (the estimated coefficients at 1.52 and 1.88 are statistically very 
close).  The effect of sewers, however, diverges a bit for men and women.  For men the 
results are robust to including neighborhood fixed effects.  For the very young sewers have a 
statistically significant and large effect.  At other ages once we include time fixed effects, we 
can no longer identify the coefficients on sewers (suggesting that men’s mortality decline has 
a very strong time component).  For women, sewers were very important at all ages (a 
standard deviation increase in sewer connection raises women’s life expectancy by nearly five 
years).  Because women had more contact with soiled water than men and most of this contact 
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was in the home it is not surprising that we can identify the effects for them better than for 
men. 
[Table VI about here] 
One last concern remains, however, that is the extensive migration, both immigration and 
residential mobility within Paris, and the selection it may induce.  As a robustness test, we 
estimate two stage least square regressions as in Table VI but replace life expectancy with age 
specific mortality for different ages and sex (for simplicity we present only result for the 
periphery).  We do not report the first stage again since it does not vary by age and is already 
reported in the previous table.  Table VII reports the results for ages 1-4, 5-19, 20-39, 40-59 
and 60-79 and includes only the peripheral neighborhoods. Each regression includes the full 
set of location and year fixed effects.  Repeating the findings of Table VI, females from age 1 
to 40 seem to receive significant benefits from the extension of sewers.  Male infants seem to 
experience very large benefits, but sewers seem not to matter at all for other ages (and in fact 
for men over 60 the coefficient suggests sewers are a bad thing).  Rent always has a negative 
coefficient and its magnitude is the same for both men and women.  These results suggest that 
women, who came into contact with wastewater much more frequently than men because of 
their homemaking activities, were more sensitive to sewers than income.  Nevertheless, the 
ubiquity of a negative impact on mortality risk of both income and sewers suggests that these 
effects are unlikely to be driven by migration into Paris, since the large majority of migrants 
were young adults. 
[Table VII about here] 
We can take the estimates from Table VII and consider what they imply for Paris as a 
whole.  To begin they offer an explanation of the divergence followed by convergence of life 
expectancy in the city. The residents of the eight high income neighborhoods we began with 
had long benefited from their high income: they had low mortality and it was declining as 
they were gaining income.  Then, in the 1890s and early 1900s they got an additional boost 
from their early adoption of sewers.  In contrast our twelve poor neighborhoods likely 
experienced smaller income gains (since this was a period of increasing wealth inequality) 
and they had to wait until 1927 to reach the level of sewer connection that the wealthy eight 
had achieved by 1906.  It is not surprising then that life expectancy diverged in the early days 
of infrastructure investment. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The increase in longevity that began in the mid-nineteenth century in North-Atlantic 
countries and spread over the next century to the rest of the world is linked to income growth.  
When looking at the process in more detail, though, it is clear that longer lives were not 
evenly distributed in the population. This was especially true in densely crowded cities with 
bad living conditions.  In the past urban dwellers experienced a huge mortality penalty.  
Nowadays inequality in income or wealth within cities is still high.  But while cities in the 
developed world have reduced inequality in life expectancy (in Paris today such differences 
are a third of what they were a century ago) thanks to infrastructure improvements, most cities 
of the developing world still face the extraordinary range of living conditions that once 
characterized Paris.  In these places to be poor is to die younger, not only because of low 
income but also because the poor areas of cities lack basic infrastructure. 
This paper documents a very close connection between life-expectancy inequality and 
economic inequality.  It also measures the contribution of public infrastructure to mortality 
decline.  To disentangle the effects of income and infrastructure on life expectancy we 
examine the pace at which sewers were adopted across Parisian neighborhoods between 1885 
and 1913.  Once controlled for all invariant neighborhoods features and all time trends, the 
effect of sewers and income are roughly comparable, with one standard deviation of either 
variable increasing life expectancy at age one by two years, or five percent. 
As a robustness check on this result, we use an IV strategy to instrument for sewer 
connection.  Building permits in the periphery give us an instrument for the rate at which 
buildings were connected to the sewers that is not correlated with income or rents.  To 
validate this instrument we examine its impact on life expectancy before sewers were adopted 
and show that although new buildings were probably better than older ones they did not 
contribute directly to improvements in life expectancy in the peripheral part of Paris. It is only 
after sewer connection became mandatory that life expectancy gains became substantial in the 
poorer neighborhoods of Paris.  One might want to exploit variation in the impact of sewers 
on different diseases or groups of individuals. Computing mortality risks for finer and finer 
subgroups of the population, however, raises ever greater problems of endogeneity. 
In thinking about differential mortality, scholars tend to stress the responsibility of either 
income or location. For instance, the rich live longer because they can afford life enhancing 
activities–better and more food, private health care, cleaner clothes, isolation from the sick 
and so on. Conversely, tropical areas have high mortality because the disease environment is 
severe.  When thinking about increasing life span, one tends to contrast private consumption 
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(of food or medicine) with public goods like sanitation and cleanliness which are assumed to 
benefit everyone. However, it is important to take sanitation and many other investments that 
prolong life, for what they are: network goods that involve some user charges.  This was true 
historically in North Atlantic countries and remains true nowadays in developing countries. 
The high user fees imposed a long delay between the initially availability of sewers 
and their adoption in the poorer districts of the periphery. That delay had significant social 
cost.  As an illustration, we estimate a counterfactual: what would the life expectancy of these 
districts have been had they achieved in 1900 the sewer connection rate that they experienced 
in 1928.  This would have tripled their connection rates from just about a quarter of buildings 
connected to more than three quarters. Using our smallest coefficients (Table VI) the gain in 
connections would have raised life expectancy by four years.  There are three ways to 
consider how substantial this gain might have been. First, this jump would have been enough 
to propel life expectancy in the worst decile of neighborhoods all the way to the level 
experienced by the median neighborhoods for Paris as a whole.  Second, had one wanted to 
achieve the same effect by increasing income (or rents) one would have had to double them; 
at 2% growth (which is twice the rate of growth of rents and likely exceeds the growth of 
wages in Paris) that would have taken 35 years.  Finally, since the life expectancy at age 1 
was about 47, the increased life span coming from sewers would have mostly involved extra 
years of work.  Two factors conspired to keep life span remained massively unequal in Paris 
on the eve of World War One.  First income gains were concentrated at the top; second the 
non-trivial user charges on sanitation also concentrated benefits towards the top.  In sewers, as 
in many other things, the trickle down is slow.  
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Table I Cross section Regressions of Life Expectancy on Rents 
 Life 
Expectancy 
1881 
  Life 
Expectancy 
1886 
  Life 
Expectancy 
1891 
Rents 
1881 
4.17 
(0.572) 
 Rents 
1886 
4.53 
(0.450) 
 Rents 
1891 
5.06 
(0.412) 
Constant 43.8 
(0.488) 
 Constant 44.1 
(0.409) 
 Constant 47.4 
(0.399) 
        
 Life 
Expectancy 
1896 
  Life 
Expectancy 
1901 
  Life 
Expectancy 
1906 
Rents 
1896 
4.77 
(0.479) 
 Rents 
1901 
4.26 
(0.393) 
 Rents 
1906 
4.07 
(0.405) 
Constant 50.22 
(0.426) 
 Constant 51.5 
(0.445) 
 Constant 52.9 
(0.449) 
        
 Life 
Expectancy 
1911 
      
Rents 
1911 
3.55 
(0.441) 
      
Constant 52.7 
(0.508) 
      
Note: the coefficients reported come from seven different linear regressions with 80 
observations each. The R2 varies between 0.33 and 0.61. Coefficients in bold are 
statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. The dependant variable is 
standardized. 
 
Table II Cross section Regressions of Sewer Connection Rate on Rents 
 Sewer 
Connection 
Rate 
 Sewer 
Connection 
Rate 
Rents 0.07     
(0.006) 
 0.11     
(0.007) 
FE-Neighborhood   YES 
FE-Year   YES 
Constant 0.32     
(0.06) 
 0.41     
(0.018) 
R² 0.06  0.96 
N 2320  2320 
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. 
Dependant variable is standardized. 
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Table III Life Expectancy and the Diffusion of Sewers 
Dependent Variable Life Expectancy-Age 1 
All Parisian Neighborhoods 
SCR 3.93 
(0.114) 
1.33 
(0.225) 
  3.02 
(0.087) 
1.01 
(0.23) 
Rent  
 4.45 
(0.102) 
1.69 
(0.281) 
3.74 
(0.85) 
1.31 
(0.29) 
Constant 50.15 
(0.149) 
51.96 
(0.473) 
50.09 
(0.104) 
52.43 
(0.468) 
50.1 
(0.84) 
52.11 
(0.47) 
FE-Neighborhood  YES  YES  YES 
FE-Year 
 
YES 
 
YES  YES 
N 2320 2320 2320 2320 2320 2320 
Adj-R2 0.34 0.90 0.44 0.89 0.63 0.89 
Dependent Variable Life Expectancy-Age 1 
Center (Arrondissements 1-11) 
SCR 3.51 
(0.14) 
-0.67 
(0.37) 
  2.87 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.38) 
Rent  
 3.81 
(0.12) 
0.25 
(0.42) 
3.30 
(0.10) 
0.29 
(0.43) 
Constant 51.96 
(0.14) 
51.95 
(0.47) 
51.09 
(0.14) 
52.58 
(0.51) 
51.00 
(0.11) 
52.64 
(0.53) 
FE-Neighborhood  YES  YES  YES 
FE-Year 
 
YES 
 
YES  YES 
N 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 
Adj-R2 0.32 0.89 0.41 0.88 0.62 0.88 
Dependent Variable Life Expectancy-Age 1 
Periphery (arrondissements 12-20) 
SCR 4.07 
(0.16) 
2.73 
(0.31) 
  3.14 
(0.13) 
2.1 
(0.33) 
Rent  
 4.93 
(0.19) 
2.87 
(0.37) 
3.83 
(0.16) 
1.94 
(0.39) 
Constant 47.99 
(0.15) 
46.17 
(0.52) 
49.27 
(0.16) 
48.38 
(0.61) 
49.23 
(0.13) 
47.7 
(0.61) 
FE-Neighborhood  YES  YES  YES 
FE-Year 
 
YES 
 
YES  YES 
N 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044 
Adj-R2 0.37 0.89 0.38 0.88 0.59 0.88 
Note: the independent variables are the sewer connection rate (SCR). Coefficients in 
bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. Dependant variable is 
standardized.  
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Table IV Life Expectancy and the Diffusion of Sewers, by Age (Men) 
Men Log Mortality Risk No Fixed Effects 
 
Time and Space Fixed Effects 
 1-4 5-19 20-39 40-59 60-69 
 
1-4 5-19 20-39 40-59 60-69 
Sewer connection  
rate  
-0.37 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.01) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
-0.12 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
 -0.25 
(0.03) 
-0.09 
(0.03) 
-0.17 
(0.02) 
-0.10 
(0.01) 
-0.034 
(0.013) 
Constant 4.81 
(0.01) 
4.20 
(0.01) 
5.04 
(0.01) 
5.97 
(0.01) 
6.51 
(0.01) 
 4.74 
(0.07) 
4.18 
(0.07) 
5.31 
(0.04) 
6.03 
(0.03) 
6.53 
(0.02) 
Adj-R2 0.37 0.20 0.06 0.19 0.07  0.68 0.45 0.71 0.76 0.42 
 
 No Fixed Effects  Time and Space Fixed Effects 
Rent 
 
-0.34 
(0.01) 
-0.17 
(0.01) 
-0.23 
(0.01) 
-0.17 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
 -0.38 
(0.04) 
-0.13 
(0.04) 
-0.28 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.015) 
Constant 4.86 
(0.01) 
4.25 
(0.01) 
5.05 
(0.01) 
5.99 
(0.01) 
6.51 
(0.01) 
 4.70 
(0.07) 
4.1 
(0.07) 
5.33 
(0.04) 
6.03 
(0.03) 
6.53 
(0.02) 
Adj-R2 0.30 0.14 0.40 0.36 0.06  0.69 0.48 0.68 0.75 0.39 
 
 No Fixed Effects  Time and Space Fixed Effects 
Sewer connection  
rate  
-0.31 
(0.01) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
-0.037 
(0.01) 
-0.08 
(0.01) 
-0.039 
(0.01) 
 -0.17 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
-0.082 
(0.01) 
-0.034 
(0.013) 
Rent 
 
-0.27 
(0.01) 
-0.13 
(0.01) 
-0.23 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
-0.036 
(0.01) 
 -0.32 
(0.04) 
-0.13 
(0.04) 
-0.20 
(0.03) 
-0.087 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.015) 
Constant 4.81 
(0.01) 
4.20 
(0.01) 
5.04 
(0.01) 
5.97 
(0.01) 
6.50 
(0.01) 
 4.73 
(0.07) 
4.1 
(0.07) 
5.30 
(0.04) 
6.03 
(0.03) 
6.53 
(0.03) 
Adj-R2 0.56 0.29 0.43 0.47 0.11  0.69 0.48 0.72 0.77 0.42 
Note: The first panel reports two coefficients for 10 separate regressions of mortality risk by age group on the sewer connection rate. The 
second panel does the same for 10 separate regressions of mortality risk by age group on the average fiscal rent. The third reports 
regressions of mortality risk by age group on the sewer connection rate and rent. Each regression is based on 29 years X 80 districts or 
2320 observations. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. 
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Table IVcontinued (Women) 
Women Log Mortality Risk No Fixed Effects 
 
Time and Space Fixed Effects 
 1-4 5-19 20-39 40-59 60-69 
 
1-4 5-19 20-39 40-59 60-69 
Sewer connection  
rate  
-0.36 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.01) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
 -0.18 
(0.03) 
-0.14 
(0.03) 
-0.11 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
-0.035 
(0.013) 
Constant 4.75 
(0.01) 
4.16 
(0.01) 
4.83 
(0.01) 
5.58 
(0.01) 
6.39 
(0.01) 
 4.55 
(0.07) 
4.14 
(0.07) 
5.03 
(0.04) 
5.51 
(0.03) 
6.39 
(0.03) 
Adj-R2 0.36 0.18 0.06 0.22 0.12  0.68 0.40 0.78 0.77 0.53 
 
 No Fixed Effects  Time and Space Fixed Effects 
Rent 
 
-0.33 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.01) 
-0.30 
(0.01) 
-0.20 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
 -0.38 
(0.04) 
-0.18 
(0.04) 
-0.27 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
Constant 4.82 
(0.01) 
4.22 
(0.01) 
4.85 
(0.01) 
5.61 
(0.01) 
6.40 
(0.01) 
 4.84 
(0.07) 
4.10 
(0.07) 
5.04 
(0.04) 
5.51 
(0.03) 
6.40 
(0.03) 
Adj-R2 0.27 0.17 0.55 0.37 0.13  0.70 0.47 0.77 0.77 0.52 
 
 No Fixed Effects  Time and Space Fixed Effects 
Sewer connection  
rate  
-0.31 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
-0.029 
(0.01) 
-0.11 
(0.01) 
-0.054 
(0.01) 
 -0.11 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.074 
(0.02) 
-0.037 
(0.013) 
Rent 
 
-0.26 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
-0.30 
(0.01) 
-0.18 
(0.01) 
-0.056 
(0.01) 
 -0.32 
(0.05) 
-0.18 
(0.05) 
-0.22 
(0.03) 
-0.094 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.018) 
Constant 4.75 
(0.01) 
4.17 
(0.01) 
4.83 
(0.01) 
5.58 
(0.01) 
6.39 
(0.01) 
 4.54 
(0.07) 
4.13 
(0.07) 
5.02 
(0.04) 
5.50 
(0.03) 
6.39 
(0.03) 
Adj-R2 0.54 0.30 0.57 0.50 0.20  0.68 0.40 0.78 0.77 0.53 
 
Note: The first panel reports two coefficients for 10 separate regressions of mortality risk by age group on the sewer connection rate. The 
second panel does the same for 10 separate regressions of mortality risk by age group on the average fiscal rent. The third reports 
regressions of mortality risk by age group on the sewer connection rate and rent. Each regression is based on 29 years X 80 districts or 
2320 observations. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. 
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Table V Life Expectancy and Building Permits 
Dependant variable: life expectancy at age 1 
   Neighborhoods included 
All Center 
(1-11) 
Periphery 
(12-20) 
All Years 
Cumulated building 
permits/1913 stock 
1.68 
(0.34) 
4.52 
(0.78) 
0.56 
(0.49) 
Constant 52.22   
(0.47) 
52.13 
(0.50) 
46.10 
(0.63) 
Adj R² 0.90 0.89 0.88 
N 2560 1408 1152 
Before 1896 
Cumulated building 
permits before 1896 
1.7 
(1.28) 
15.72 
(4.29) 
2.10 
(3.17) 
Constant 50.46  
(0.66) 
49.63 
(0.74) 
44.44  
(1.21) 
Location and Time F.E. Y Y Y 
Adj R² 0.88 0.91 0.17 
N 1120 616 1152 
1896 and after 
Cumulated building 
permits before 1896 
2.25 
(0.47) 
3.69 
(1.06) 
1.07 
(0.63) 
Constant 51.60  
(0.52) 
51.91 
(0.54) 
44.36  
(0.65) 
Location and Time F.E. Y Y Y 
Adj R² 0.89 0.88 0.87 
N 1440 792 1152 
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level.
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Table VI I.V. Regressions of Life Expectancy on Sewer Connection Rate 
First stage endogenous variable: Sewer Connection Rate (SCR) 
 Sample 
 All Center 
(1-11) 
Periphery 
(12-20) 
All Center 
(1-11) 
Periphery 
(12-20) 
Periphery 
(12-20) 
 Women and Men together Women Men 
Fiscal Rent 0.296 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.02) 
0.34 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.27 
(0.044) 
-0.12 
(0.05) 
-0.12 
(0.05) 
-0.12 
(0.05) 
Cumulated building 
permits 
0.293 
(0.02) 
0.44 
(0.04) 
0.35 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.60 
(0.02) 
0.83 
(0.03) 
0.41 
(0.02) 
0.33 
(0.04) 
0.35 
(0.04) 
-0.37 
(0.06) 
-0.37 
(0.06) 
-0.37 
(0.06) 
Location and Time 
F.E. 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
F-stat 268.9 103.6 386.5 15.91 0.24 67.3 67.3 67.3 
Adj R2 0.27 0.18 0.47 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 
 Second stage independent variable: Life expectancy at Age 1  
SCR 0.45 
(0.38) 
0.99 
(0.57) 
1.86 
(0.36) 
10.27 
(2.67) 
104.1 
(210.4) 
2.96 
(1.44) 
4.7 
(2.05) 
-1.26 
(2.01) 
Fiscal Rent 3.96 
(0.14) 
3.21 
(0.14) 
3.96 
(0.21) 
0.33 
(0.64) 
-24.80 
(49.3) 
1.77 
(0.72) 
1.52 
(0.91) 
1.88 
(0.91) 
Constant 51.98 
(0.25) 
52.70 
(0.41) 
50.27 
(0.26) 
48.641 
(0.99) 
14.76 
(74.18) 
46.86 
(0.94) 
50.56 
(1.19) 
44.39 
(1.19) 
Location and Time 
F.E. 
NO NO NO YES YES YES Yes Yes 
N 1440 792 648 1440 792 648 648 648 
R2 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.84 0 0.89 0.85 0.96 
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. 
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Table VII I.V. Regressions of mortality risks by age and sex on Sewer Connection Rate 
 
 Second stage dependent variable: log (probability of death /1000) 
Neighborhood fixed effects 
Men  Women 
Age  
1-4 
Age  
5-19 
Age  
20-39 
Age  
40-59 
Age  
60-79 
 Age  
1-4 
Age  
5-19 
Age  
20-39 
Age  
40-59 
Age  
60-79 
SCR -0.24 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
-0.10 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
 -0.24 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.13 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Fiscal Rent -0.43 
(0.09) 
-0.36 
(0.09) 
-0.35 
(0.06) 
-0.17 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
 -0.35 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.34 
(0.05) 
-0.24 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Constant 4.68 
(0.10) 
3.91 
(0.10) 
5.11 
(0.07) 
6.06 
(0.05) 
6.67 
(0.05) 
 4.74 
(0.10) 
4.22 
(0.11) 
4.94 
(0.06) 
5.63 
(0.06) 
6.45 
(0.05) 
N 648 648 648 648 648  648 648 648 648 648 
R2 0.73 0.41 0.78 0.73 0.45  0.72 0.36 0.84 0.76 0.59 
 Second stage dependent variable: log (probability of death /1000) 
Neighborhood and time fixed effects 
Men  Women 
Age  
1-4 
Age  
5-19 
Age  
20-39 
Age  
40-59 
Age  
60-79 
 Age  
1-4 
Age  
5-19 
Age  
20-39 
Age  
40-59 
Age  
60-79 
SCR -0.76 
(0.23) 
0.17 
(0.22) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.30 
(0.10) 
 
-0.50 
(0.21) 
-0.34 
(0.24) 
-0.28 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
Fiscal Rent -0.54 
(0.10) 
-0.33 
(0.10) 
-0.31 
(0.06) 
-0.14 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
 -0.41 
(0.10) 
-0.20 
(0.11) 
-0.36 
(0.06) 
-0.23 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Constant 4.49 
(0.13) 
3.96 
(0.13) 
5.23 
(0.08) 
6.15 
(0.06) 
6.82 
(0.06) 
 4.57 
(0.13) 
4.21 
(0.14) 
4.92 
(0.07) 
5.63 
(0.07) 
6.49 
(0.06) 
N 648 648 648 648 648  648 648 648 648 648 
R2 0.71 0.42 0.79 0.76 0.40  0.73 0.37 0.85 0.78 0.62 
Note: this table only reports the second stage because the first stage is identical across all age groups the coefficients can be found in 
Table 9, columns 3, 4 and 5. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% (italics at 10%) level. 
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Figure I Life expectancy at age 5 within Paris, compared to France 
 
 
Figure II Average Rents by Neighborhoods in Paris, 1876 
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Figure III Life Expectancy in 1910 as predicted by the 1880 Rent-Life Expectancy 
Relationship 
 
Figure IV Share of Buildings connected to the Sewer by Districts 
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics of the longitudinal sample 
Panel A. All        
 
N Year Mean SD total 
SD 
between 
SD 
within Rank 
Life expectancy  
at age 1 (years) 2640 1881-1913 49.35 7.02 5.54 4.36 0.73 
  
              
Average rents – 
complete (francs) 320 
1878, 1890, 1900, and 
1910 656.42 606.81 595.09 131.97 0.93 
Average rents – 
 fiscal (francs) 2640 1881-1913 896.12 797.48 789.75 140.82 0.94 
  
              
Sewer connection  
rate (SCR) (%) 2320 1885-1913 32.05 27.97 0.07 27.05  
Building permits (%) 1440 1896-1913 16.83 22.61 17.07 14.93  
        
Panel B. Centre (44 neighborhoods)      
Life expectancy  
at age 1 (years) 1452 1881-1913 51.50 6.65 5.14 4.29 0.77 
  
            
  
Average rents – 
complete (francs) 176 
1878, 1890, 1900, and 
1910 843.64 674.51 672.23 104.00 0.89 
Average rents –  
fiscal (francs) 1452 1881-1913 1132.39 854.82 855.33 123.60 0.90 
  
            
 
Sewer connection  
rate (SCR) (%) 1276 1885-1913 34.46 29.00 5.74 28.44 
 
Building permits (%) 792 1896-1913 8.91 12.59 9.51 8.36 
 
        
Panel C. Periphery (36 neighborhoods)      
Life expectancy   
at age 1 (years) 1188 1881-1913 46.72 6.56 4.88 4.45 0.63 
  
            
  
Average rents – 
complete (francs) 144 
1878, 1890, 1900, and 
1910 427.61 410.84 382.42 160.04 0.89 
Average rents – 
 fiscal (francs) 1188 1881-1913 607.36 60.39 594.16 159.43 0.81 
  
            
 
Sewer connection 
 rate (SCR) (%) 1044 1885-1913 29.11 26.38 7.71 25.26 
 
Building permits (%) 648 1896-1913 26.51 27.79 19.28 20.26 
 
Note: All data are for 80 neighborhoods. “Rank” gives the linear correlation between neighborhoods 
ranking in 1881 and in 1911 (1876 and 1910 for share of poor households and complete rents). 
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Appendix B. Computing Mortality risk and Life expectancy 
Our goal is to compute life expectancy at age one.  Implicitly this is a simple 
procedure that integrates age specific mortality risk.  Yet because the age categories reported 
at the neighborhood (quartier) level are not stable over time and do not necessarily accord 
between the Annuaires–that give the deaths–and the Censuses–that report the number of 
living–, we must make corrections. We proceed in three steps. 
First, we adjust both the mortality and population reports in order to obtain the number 
of deaths and the number of living for the same age intervals: one to four; five to nineteen; 
twenty to thirty-nine; forty to fifty-nine; and finally sixty or more years old. For each year we 
also have the report that breaks down deaths by gender and five year age groups for Paris as a 
whole. We use it to correct the coarser quartier level reports. Take for instance the death 
reports between 1881 and 1893: instead of giving total deaths for age groups 5-19, 20-39, and 
40-59, the Annuaires’ table uses the age intervals 5-14, 15-34, and 35-59. So we estimate, 
from the data for Paris as a whole, the share of deceased aged 15-19 among those aged 15-34. 
We apply this share to the groups defined at the neighborhoodlevel to get the number of 
deaths between 15 and 19 years old. We add this number to total deaths in the age group 5-14 
and subtract it from those in the age group 15-34. We proceed in the same way for the age 
groups 15-34 and 35-59.  Finally, we estimate smaller age-interval for the older ages using the 
distribution of death for Paris as a whole: we subdivide both 40-59, and 60 and over intervals 
into five-years age groups. 
Second, we need the population at risk. We estimate inter-census populations for every 
year. The standard way to do so is to evaluate the change in population between census years 
by combining the effect of mortality and net migration.  In the case of a closed population, 
such estimates are (almost) immediate given the population total by age in a census year and 
the number of deaths each year (one just needs to make hypotheses about the relationship 
between birth cohorts and calendar years).  At the other extreme, if migration rates are very 
high, then the flow of new people in the city determines the size of a given age group.  This is 
the case for Paris and we use a linear interpolation of the size of the population of a given age 
between the two adjoining censuses. Such a procedure neglects both mortality shocks and 
variation in migration patterns that might affect one age group more severely than another in a 
given inter-census year.  Given the rather coarse nature of our data we could not try to capture 
the differentiated consequence of either effects at the neighborhood level without making 
heroic assumptions. 
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Third, we compute a life table for each year and neighborhood: to do so we compute a 
set of age-specific death rates (m) for each year and neighborhood by dividing the number of 
death in the age group by the number of individuals living in that age group.  We can then 
produce probabilities of dying (q) using the standard formula q=n*m/(1+(n-a)*m), n and a 
being the average number of person-years lived in the interval by, respectively, those who 
survived that age group and those dying in that age group.  Given that we don’t have the exact 
age at death, the value of a, the average number of person-years lived by the deceased, is 
borrowed from another population, e.g. Keyfitz and Fliegler (1968: 491).  The step from death 
probabilities to mortality tables and life expectancy at each age is then straightforward 
(Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2001: 42-50). 
Overall, we have tried to make the simplest assumptions in these computations to 
avoid biasing our results.  When these assumptions matter, they do so in ways that tend to 
understate differential mortality.  In particular, the average number of person-years lived by 
those dying in the last age group (that is ∞a80) comes out to just under eight years which is 
perhaps too optimistic.  More importantly it seems likely that this number varied across 
neighborhood: even among the old, mortality was probably more severe for the poor than for 
the rich.  In this case we would be underestimating mortality in the poorer neighborhoods and 
as a consequence understating the actual mortality differential.  Yet it seems logical, at least 
to start, to make the same assumptions for all the neighborhoods so as to insure we do not 
produce differential mortality by construction.  In the end, our computations probably 
understate mortality differences across neighborhoods, but the extent of the bias is limited. 
After all the life expectancies we compute for the census years (when we have the exact 
population) are very similar to those for inter-census years.  Varying the average life span per 
interval or the maximal age in the life table has some impact on life expectancy but very little 
on differences among neighborhoods in the city. 
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Appendix C. Estimating the rent to income gradient for Paris 
The analysis in this paper relies on rents because average rents are reported by 
neighborhood for each year in tax reports.  Using the real estate censuses of 1890, 1900, and 
1911 we show that average rents are good statistic for a variety of other moments of the 
distribution by neighborhood.  What we lack is any detailed information about the distribution 
of income by neighborhood.  Yet by collating different piece of information we can generate a 
distribution of income by arrondissement for the 1890s. 
We start with the population census of 1891. For each district (arrondissement) it 
distributes the population into 240 different occupational groups(within 32 branches).  For 
each group it gives separately and by sex the number of owners/managers (patrons), white 
collar workers and supervisors (employés) and unskilled workers (ouvriers). It also totals the 
number of family members not gainfully employed and the numbers of servants (domestiques) 
employed by the households in each group.  Thus to each occupational group corresponds 10 
categories of population (6 categories for gainfully employed individuals and 4 for their 
dependents) from female owner managers to male servants.  Considering the fact that 
households with higher incomes are more likely to employ more servants, and that unskilled 
workers most likely have lower incomes than owners/managers, one can ask what is the 
correlation between the number of servants per owners/managers and rents (0.96), or the 
correlation between the share of the gainfully employed that are unskilled workers and rents (-
0.87). 
The next step is to estimate income for the six gainfully employed categories.  For 
about half the occupational groups we can use the 1896industrial survey (which reports 
income for both employés and ouvriers).  To keep things simple we apply the average income 
over Paris by occupational group (most of the variance in reported income is across gender, 
category, and rank).  That still leaves out large chunks of the population who were not 
surveyed: all occupational groups in services; all owner/managers; those who lived from 
capital income (rentiers); and domestics. 
For rentiers and owner managers we rely on estate tax filings for 1892 (see Piketty, 
Postel-Vinay, Rosenthal 2014).  These individual data gives both wealth at death and 
occupation.  We assign all the estates whose owners where reported as without occupation or 
retired to one category (rentiers) and all those who reported a current profession to another 
(employed).  The rentiers category has on average two and half time the wealth of those who 
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are currently in an occupation.  Rentiers are also extremely spatially differentiated with those 
in the rich 8thdistrict having nearly 30 times the wealth of those in the poor 20thdistrict. We 
assume that wealth produces a 4% return to compute income from wealth.  We then estimate 
the mean by district and apply it to the total of individuals who declared living off their 
capital in the 1891 census. 
For owners/managers in industry, we sum the income estimated from the wealth at 
death of the employed category with the labor income of white collar workers in industry.  
For a few branches in services, smaller surveys provide some income information but we lack 
income for most service occupations. In the absence of further data we give these occupations 
the mean gender-category Parisian wage. Hence a white collar worker in a department store 
receives the same income as a bank cleric.  Considering that service occupations range from 
butchers and hairdresser to bankers and stock brokers, their occupation are likely to have had 
an income variance much larger than manufacturing but smaller than that of rentiers. As a 
result, we are suppressing part of the variance in income between districts.  Nevertheless we 
do preserve part of the between districts variance because the distribution of employment by 
sex and categories was rather systematic (in wealthier districts there are more men, more 
employés and fewer ouvriers).  Finally, given that servants did not make decision about 
housing we leave them aside. 
This procedure produces a set of incomes that are tightly correlated with rents as 
shown in table AC1. The correlation is 0.84 which means that rents and incomes were closely 
matched. Moreover, although that procedure is our favorite specification, other ways to order 
the various information we gather (income in the industrial sector, rents, share of servants, 
etc.) produce the similar results.  For instance, if we only look at industrial occupations we get 
a correlation of 0.83; if we ignore rentiers, the correlation drops to 0.78; if we impute 
arrondissement average incomes to occupations for which we do not have data, the correlation 
becomes 0.85. 
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Table AC1 Imputed incomes and measured rents. 
District 
(Arrondissement) 
Mean 
Income 
Mean 
 Rent Ratio 
1 3428.5 1127.5 0.33 
2 2589.3 846.0 0.33 
3 2362.7 613.8 0.26 
4 2481.4 666.4 0.27 
5 3103.3 675.5 0.22 
6 3433.0 959.9 0.28 
7 4502.1 1564.1 0.35 
8 22450.3 2654.1 0.12 
9 5590.5 1224.7 0.22 
10 2681.7 735.5 0.27 
11 2157.6 495.3 0.23 
12 2125.4 469.9 0.22 
13 1907.1 330.1 0.17 
14 2050.9 432.5 0.21 
15 2101.5 375.3 0.18 
16 4146.5 1640.2 0.40 
17 2724.2 896.4 0.33 
18 1965.6 400.6 0.20 
19 1872.7 379.1 0.20 
20 1770.7 257.3 0.15 
 
